

**NATIONAL YOUTH INCLUSION PROGRAM – PROJovem**

Case Study

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Introductory Note: This case study was the result of conversations between UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund and the Brazilian government, through the National Youth Department, so that ProJovem could be analyzed by an independent group focusing on the challenges encountered from its creation until its consolidation. This study includes lessons learned and, above all, the possibilities of replicating the program starting from the solutions found, and even unexpected effects that deserve attention. The document does not intend to evaluate the program, but to analyze the main challenges of ProJovem, given the reality in Brazil, and to identify its principal elements of replicability at the end of a cycle of implementation.

The ideas and opinions expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Population Fund.

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## Initial Considerations

This production refers to the consultancy for implementing a case study of the National Youth Inclusion Program – ProJovem, including a description, investigation and analysis of the likely aspects of replicability of the program in other countries, since it is the main youth policy in the Federative Republic of Brazil.

ProJovem, created in 2005, was established as a national icon of youth policy in 2008, and from 2009 on it has given a name to the unification of a series of national public policies aimed at the rural, urban and adolescent segments.

The production under discussion will focus on ProJovem, implemented, executed and evaluated, between the years 2005 and 2008. The design of the program will be presented, along with the question of the demographic dividend in Brazil and the need for youth policies, and the impact and analysis of likely aspects of replicability.

### 1. The demographic dividend in Brazil and the need for youth policies

Starting with changes in the age structure of the Brazilian population, caused by lower birth and mortality rates, there is a period of demographic transition in the country today in which the economically active population significantly exceeds the dependent population ratio. According to authors in the area, this lower level of dependency has a macroeconomic effect, because it signifies greater savings capacity, an indispensable prerequisite for raising investments needed for economic development. (ALVES, s.d.)

By examining the 2010 Census data, it can be seen that the economically active population accounts for 77.5% of the total Brazilian population.

Table 1. The Brazilian population, per age group, IBGE Census 2010.

Age Group	Total Population	Percentage
Over age 65	14,081,480	7.3
<b>Between age 10 and 64</b>	<b>147,908,785</b>	<b>77.5</b>
from 0 to age 9	28,765,534	15.0
Total	190,755,799	100

Source: IBGE Census, 2010. Data extracted from the age group pyramid available at: <http://www.censo2010.ibge.gov.br/sinopse/webservice/default.php?cod1=0&cod2=&cod3=0&frm=piramide>

This situation, called the "demographic dividend", can be a driving growth factor in the first three decades of the new millennium. The demographic time generates great expectations, and its medium and long term assumption is that this same population, which can generate increased domestic savings, undergoes an aging process, and with current demographic trends tends to reverse the age group pyramid with an increase in the elderly population and a birth rate below population percentage replacement, which leads to a further increase in the proportion of dependents relative to the economically active population.

Therefore it is notable that the demographic dividend is a growth opportunity whose advantage is conditioned to the country's ability to anticipate it and pursue policies that maximize this advantage. (ALVES et al, 2010)

In this respect, the question arises about Brazil's ability to revert the opportunity experienced by its demographic predicament on behalf of its economic growth. The country has a history of social inequality, reflected in data such as those presented by DIEESE (2009) which, covering the population over age 10, show a profile of low education in the labor force, where 8.2% of the economically active population have no level of schooling, 32.7% have incomplete primary education, 10.3% have complete primary education, 7.4% have incomplete secondary education, 26.5% have complete secondary education, 5% have incomplete higher education and only 9.9% have complete higher education.

With respect to household income, measured as wages received, the majority of the population has an average income of between 0.5 and 2 minimum wages as shown in the table below.

Table 2. Total population according to per capita household income, Brazil 1980-2000.

**População total, segundo renda domiciliar per capita  
Brasil – 1980-2000**

<b>Renda domiciliar per capita (em salários mínimos)</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>2000</b>
Até 0,5 SM	57.711.820	70.332.627	53.218.960
De 0,5 a 1 SM	26.407.465	30.702.893	39.361.466
De 1 a 2 SM	17.159.860	21.598.045	36.864.377
De 2 a 3 SM	5.767.600	7.610.639	13.941.868
De 3 a 5 SM	4.453.430	5.656.629	11.814.966
De 5 a 10 SM	2.595.165	3.464.631	8.604.410
Mais de 10 SM	898.800	1.430.408	4.826.407
<b>Total</b>	<b>115.060.520</b>	<b>140.799.834</b>	<b>168.638.201</b>

Fonte: IBGE, Censos Demográficos de 1980, 1991 e 2000.

Total population, according to per capita household income, Brazil – 1980-2000

Per capita household income (in minimum wages)

Up to 0.5 MW

From 0.5 to 1 MW

From 1 to 2 MW

From 2 to 3 MW

From 3 to 5 MW

From 5 to 10 MW

Over 10 MW

Total

Source: IBGE, Census Demographica from 1980, 1991 and 2000.

Considering that fertility levels are higher among low-income families and that the structural rigidity of Brazilian society is not conducive to social mobility (BRITO, 2008), it is probable that most of the young people who make up the demographic dividend today come from situations of social exclusion with possible profiles of low levels of education, little or no professional training and also difficulty in entering the job market.

However, if on the one hand demographic conditions are favorable to economic development, on the other, so that this dividend does not become a burden, policies aimed at breaking the vicious circle of social inequalities are needed. (ALVES, s.d.; BRITO, 2008)

It should be stressed that historically there has been some delay on the part of Brazilian governmental authorities to develop long and medium term actions that could qualify the population who would enter the labor force. Sposito and Carrano (2003) have stated that until the 1990s there were few public policies aimed specifically at people aged 18 to 29. Before 1995 there were only three programs targeted

specifically to young people, which were: the Adolescent and Youth Health Program (Ministry of Health), the Special Training Program (PET – Ministry of Education) and the Young Scientist Award (Ministry of Science and Technology).

Between 1995 and 2002 young people began to take hold of the agenda of government policies, however the discussion was very timid and focused on stereotypes of fear of losing youth to crime or drugs. Thus, the proposals were based on occupying young people's idle time to prepare them to carry out the responsibilities of adult life. The broadening of the debate and the greater visibility of young people may be seen by the number of programs created between 1995-2002. There were over 30 government programs/projects in all, focusing more or less on age groups commonly considered as young people. Of those, only 18 focused on youth.

Sposito and Carrano (2003), evaluating the policies pursued during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso – FHC (1995-2002), consider that the actions were disjointed, with projects with common objectives, clientele and geographic areas overlapping; which according to the authors reveals the still fragile institutionalism of federal youth policies.

Of the programs proposed by the Cardoso government, *Brazil in Action Program*, implemented in 2000 by the Ministry of Planning, seems to be a first attempt to articulate a macro-policy for youth that would point out the path to be pursued by the national youth policy proposed by the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2010). The program proposed the coordination of a group of programs to assist young people aged 15 to 29 years. Adding the actions of six ministries under its management, 11 programs and their interactions with state governments, it was aimed at promoting the integration of governmental actions with the same target audience, or in the same specific geographical area of operation. (SPOSITTO & CARRANO, 2003)

In 2003, during Lula's government, the National Youth Policy was created in response to the demands of different groups of youth movements and civil society organizations, coupled with initiatives on the part of the legislature and the Federal Government.

As part of the policy, an Interministerial Work Group was created, coordinated by the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic, which was responsible for mapping and analyzing public policies, data, studies and assessments regarding young people in Brazil, identifying through this work the main challenges that the guidelines for the National Youth Policy should address.

The group assessed that there were approximately 34 million young people aged 15 to 24 years who were affected by the worst rates of unemployment, truancy, lack of professional training, homicides, and involvement with drugs and crime. Added to this scenario was the lack of public policies for young people in general and more specifically for those aged 18 to 24 years.

It can be observed that the assessment captures exactly the population that is the basis of the labor force, i.e., young people who should begin their activities in the productive process, but in 2003 found themselves in a situation of exclusion and marginalization. It should be noted that the prospect of these young people entering the labor force was already foreseen in the 2000 Census, when they were aged 5 to 14 years and comprised 19.9% of the total population recorded in the Census, and where the future demographic dividend had already been predicted.

Thus, based on the guidance of the group, the Brazilian government created a macro policy initially composed of the National Youth Department, the National Youth Council and the National Youth Inclusion Program – ProJovem<sup>1</sup>, with centralized structures in the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic.

This policy offers a proposal of full training of young people, with the following points of action: conclusion of primary education for youth who have completed the fourth grade, but not the eighth grade of primary education, and promotion of community organization and professional training at the basic level. By covering these points, the proposal aims to break the cycles of poverty and exclusion that have characterized the life history of its target audience, which is composed

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<sup>1</sup> Many countries began programs to elevate education and labor qualification geared toward young people starting in the 1980s. In South America there are various examples of programs geared toward youth, some still in operation: Colombia Joven; Chile Joven; the Juventud Vigorosa program in Ecuador; the Empleabilidad Juvenil and Primer Paso programs in Argentina; ProJOVEN in Paraguay; PROJOVEN in Guatemala; PROJoven in Peru and Projoven in Uruguay, among others.

predominantly of young people who have a history of truancy and unemployment or underemployment, with little or no professional training.

Considering the program in a manner that is linked to the possibilities of the demographic dividend, it could be said that ProJovem was a solution found by the Brazilian government to avoid losing this generation that carries the expectation of transforming favorable demographic conditions into a powerful cycle to improve the country's economy, while creating an accumulation of reserves needed for the already anticipated aging process of the population.

Below are briefly detailed the design and structure of the program.

## **2. National Youth Inclusion Program – ProJovem**

The national youth policy had a new configuration starting from 2004 with the formation of the Interministerial Youth Work Group, consisting of 19 ministries and coordinated by the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

As a result of the Work Group, through Law No. 11,129 of June 30, 2005, the Brazilian federal government established the National Youth Department, directly linked to the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic, established the National Youth Council and launched the National Youth Inclusion Program – ProJovem.

ProJovem was created with the objective of acting simultaneously in promoting schooling and professional training for youths, and also the involvement of young people by developing community action projects. The model proposed, to integrate education, work and citizenship, was different from the prevailing educational policies in that it proposed an action that would reach different spheres of juvenile life.

Based on Article 81 of the Law of Directives and Bases of National Education, ProJovem was approved as an experience directed toward the portion of youth assessed as most affected by the processes of economic and social exclusion. The program was aimed at young people aged 18 to 24 years, inhabitants of capitals and

cities with over 200,000 inhabitants, who had finished fourth grade but not primary education, and who had no formal job connections.


The course, lasting 12 consecutive months, provided the young participants with opportunities to increase their levels of schooling, with primary education certification, qualification for work and the planning and execution of community actions.

The course totaled 1,600 hours/classes divided among school training (800 hours), professional training (350 hours), community action development (50 hours) and 400 hours of off-site activities. The curriculum was proposed in an integrated manner in which training would be planned with a multidisciplinary approach, combining the work done in classrooms, workshops, laboratories and field training, among others. The pedagogical structure, unified in an Integrated Teaching Plan (ITP), included four Training Units lasting three months each on the topics: (i) Youth and the City (II) Youth and Work, (iii) Youth and Communication and (iv) Youth and Citizenship. All teaching materials and examinations were designed exclusively for the program.

Students who attended 75% or more of the classes and who turned in the works requested by the teachers on time would receive a scholarship of R\$100.00 (one hundred reais) per month, limited to 12 months.

The classes were taught in Nuclei that operated in locations selected for the infrastructure they offered and for their proximity to the enrolled students' homes. Five groups operated in each Nucleus, each one with a maximum of 30 students. The Nuclei were linked to the Youth Station, a place that would serve as a meeting point for students to seek information and guidance, develop group activities and hold cultural events. It also contained a multimedia collection and equipment that complemented the work done in the Nuclei. Each Youth Station was composed of eight Nuclei. The following figure illustrates training logistics of the Nuclei and Youth Stations.

Figure 1. Structure of the ProJovem Nuclei and Youth Stations.



Nucleus --- Group 1/Group 2/Group 3/Group 4/Group 5

Youth Station --- Nucleus 1/Nucleus 2/Nucleus 3/Nucleus 4/Nucleus 5/Nucleus 6/Nucleus 7/Nucleus 8

Source: Created by the authors.

Thus, the purpose of the program was to contribute to the reintegration of young people into the schools, to expand professional training and assist in their entry or reentry into the job market and help them to identify possibilities for intervention in community life.

ProJovem was organized into five integrated systems to ensure implementation of the course at all the organizational levels set forth in the program guidelines. They are: 1) Instructional System: responsible for organizing the teaching materials to sustain the teaching and learning process; 2) Operating System; 3) Educational Support System for Students; 4) Communication and Information System; and 5) Program Monitoring and Evaluation System.

The program had a Steering Committee coordinated by the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic, integrated by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labor and Employment and the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger. The local branches of operations in the capitals were the City Halls and the Federal District government. Other institutions or organizations were able to support and join the program, but that link was the responsibility of local coordination.

The program introduced an innovation, so far little used in Brazil, to implement its activities and begin external evaluation at the same time. The creation of a Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES), grouping several institutions of higher education, was shown to be a promising experience and capable of bringing together different expertise on the same topic.

The Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) was created as one of the components of ProJovem in order to conduct research for evaluating the program as set forth in the law:

*§ 1º ProJovem will be valid for a period of two (2) years and shall be evaluated at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> (second) year in order to ensure the quality of the program. (Article 1 Law No. 11,129 of June 30, 2005, which established the National Youth Inclusion Program – ProJovem, and other provisions)*

The goal of MES was to produce data, information and knowledge that would allow monitoring of implementation, program evaluation and evaluation of the quality of the course in educational terms.

Initially, in 2005, only two subsystems were designed: an external one, managed by an institution of higher education that would coordinate the work of other institutions and was responsible for monitoring and evaluating the program, and an internal one coordinated by another institution of higher education that would be responsible for monitoring school data, attendance and management of the program.

As work began and the partner institutions were grouped, the work dynamic changed and the program's national coordination chose to establish four subsystems:

*1. Monitoring Subsystem:* responsible for producing the information needed to manage the program at different levels, such as monitoring the registration and matriculation of students; training and allocation of teachers and coordinators; attendance records; and curricular activities. This subsystem was also responsible for information passed on to the financial institution to pay the students' benefits.

2. *Supervision Subsystem*: responsible for the inspection of Nuclei, Youth Stations and training agencies in order to verify implementation of the program guidelines at the beginning.

3. *Student External Evaluation Subsystem*: responsible for developing external educational tools for evaluating the training of students as well as for evaluating teaching performance results.

4. *Program Evaluation Subsystem*: responsible for research on the evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of ProJovem.

Given the number of participating cities, initially in all Brazilian capitals and the Federal District, and in the second year in cities of metropolitan areas with more than 200,000 inhabitants, the program's national coordination decided to enter into an agreement with seven universities called Regional Institutions (RI), as described in the following chart:

Chart 1. Regional Institutions participating in MES, their states and cities.

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>States</b>	<b>Cities</b>
Universidade de Brasília – UnB	Central-West	Distrito Federal, Goiás, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul.	Aparecida de Goiânia, Brasília, Campo Grande, Cuiabá, Goiânia and Palmas.
Universidade Federal da Bahia – UFBA	Northeast 1	Alagoas, Bahia, Piauí, Sergipe and Maranhão.	Aracajú, Maceió, Salvador, São Luiz and Teresina.
Universidade Federal de Pernambuco – UFPE	Northeast 2	Ceará, Paraíba, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte.	Fortaleza, João Pessoa, Natal, Recife, Olinda, Paulista, Jaboatão dos Guararapes and Caucaia.
Universidade Federal do Pará – UFPA	North	Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia and Roraima.	Ananindeua, Belém, Boa Vista, Macapá, Manaus, Porto Velho and Rio Branco.
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora – UFJF	Southeast 1	São Paulo	São Paulo, Carapicuíba, Diadema, Embu das Artes, Guarulhos, Itaquaquecetuba, Mogi das Cruzes, Osasco, Santo André and Suzano.
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – UFMG	Southeast 2	Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro.	Belo Horizonte, Contagem, Vitória, Serra, Vila Velha, Rio de Janeiro, Belford Roxo, Duque de Caxias, Magé, Niterói, Nova Iguaçu and São João de Meriti.
Universidade Federal do Paraná – UFPR	South	Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.	Curitiba, Florianópolis, Porto Alegre, Viamão, Novo Hamburgo, Gravataí and Canoas.

Source: Final report of the original ProJovem, 2005-2008. Brazil, 2010.

With the lines of action defined and the agreements established, the RIs were divided into work groups (WG) and the activities began. Over time the WGs had different compositions.

In addition to the subsystems, the National Coordination of ProJovem instituted the Technical Council as a decision-making body for decisions made by the work groups of the different subsystems. The Technical Council was made up of the national coordinator of ProJovem and all the RI coordinators.

Execution of the program took place at different times in Brazil and became so widespread that in 2008 several policies focused on youth in other ministries took on the name ProJovem and also double names, such as Urban ProJovem, which was the original ProJovem, Adolescent ProJovem and Rural ProJovem.

The manner in which the program was implemented and the adherence of the municipalities can be attributed to the program's concept of central management in the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic and will be addressed in the following section.

### **3. ProJovem – Innovations**

The political decision of the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic (PR) was configured as an important guideline for the management of youth policy. The three partner ministries – the Ministry of Education (MEC), the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) and the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) – comprising the administration of the program, participated in its management in a complementary way, while the PR took charge of decisions regarding the program.

As previously mentioned, ProJovem raises the initiative to unite different players in managing a program aimed at a specific target audience. The Brazil in Action Program, implemented in 2000, can be considered a pioneer in the attempt to unite different ministries and different projects. ProJovem consolidated the initiative of different areas in the topic of youth, and assembled the project and programs. In addition, the decision of the PR to centralize management designated the ministries on the same level of execution and left them under the command of the Presidency.

The political power of the Presidency of the Republic ensured that in the first official year of execution, in 2006, the program was implemented in 27 states under the evaluation of an external group composed of seven federal institutions of higher education (RI).

The fact that implementing the evaluation of the program began at the same time as the program, although not for the first time, caused some process issues to be resolved early in the program. The monitoring done by the Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) allowed corrections in the program's design to be made in a focused way and on time. But the monitoring and evaluation design had limitations and needed to be readjusted at the beginning of the process.

The initial idea, that an institution would be responsible for the monitoring and coordination of evaluation activities, was discarded right at the start of the activities. Some RIs did not follow the coordination's orders and disagreements soon arose. The work groups, created to direct the studies and activities of each area, had their makeup continuously reformulated. The solution found by the program's national coordination (NC) was to place a national level coordination to manage the activities carried out by the WGs.

Of the four subsystems, monitoring was the only one that acted autonomously. The others – supervision, program evaluation and external evaluation, – operated in accordance with the decisions of their work groups together with the national coordination.

The WGs, in addition to programming activities appropriate to each one, carried out the building of tools and collection or systematization of data. Not all the RIs had participants in each group, which resulted in a divergence in the deliberation time of the Technical Council that brought the coordinators of the RIs and the National Coordination together. The solution found by the NC was to encourage the RIs to participate in all the groups. Once the issue of representation was resolved, the problem of an excess of participants began, which made the meetings unproductive because of the lack of convergence in the methodologies to be used. This problem was circumvented as far as possible by the WG coordinators, but the closing discussions were initially used only for deliberations, which was the technical council.

At first this lack of orchestration of the MES by a single institution created other problems: an excess of research tools, data collection, data overlapping and entries to the classroom. The frequent entries in the classroom caused the city coordinations to create a climate of animosity toward the RIs that was resolved only through the intervention of the NC.

The solution found by the national coordination to reduce research tools and entries in the classroom was to unite the WG coordinators so they could systematize what should be collected and what seemed to be overlapping in the research tools. This gave the program's evaluation research a focus on issues of effectiveness, since they would use supervision data for implementation research and it gave supervision a more dynamic character.

With the large amount of data collected, a problem came up regarding the handling of the information produced. At this time MES's biggest challenge emerged: to take advantage of the ample availability of data in useful analysis in order to improve the program. Initially the demand for data collection was so great that there was neither time nor technical staff to analyze them. An RI, the one with the largest staff, had to take over the responsibility of data evaluation and consequently evaluation of the program. Given all of this, one of the MES's major goals was to broaden academic knowledge about Brazilian youth and public policies for youth and it was affected in this first year of implementing the program. After the RI assumed the delegation of the work and the systematization of data, partial evaluation of the program was consolidated.

Another difficulty encountered in the MES was the convergence of knowledge. The RIs had various specializations, all of them fundamental on a proposed consortium of universities, but when the groups met, the absence of accumulated information about a particular subject impeded the decision making process. In this case, the NC intervened by putting an end to the clashes, but could not handle the differences. Furthermore, an additional challenge for MES was the implementation of external evaluations (diagnostic evaluation and final external national exam). Each ProJovem student had to take an initial exam and also a final exam to assess his or her degree of proficiency. These activities involved the organization and the training of

many examiners, which created weighty coordination logistics and required a great deal of time from the hired specialists.

The combined experience of MES, the shared management of ProJovem and the creation of the National Youth Department are a reflection of the stable macroeconomy, the line of combating poverty, the elimination of social inequality and the inclusive growth of the government platform in Brazil over the last decade. Along this lines, the next section will focus on the impact of ProJovem as a policy aimed at youth and its importance in breaking cycles of poverty and social exclusion.

#### **4. ProJovem – Impact**

ProJovem's design was made possible through specific research to delineate the young people of Brazil. The focus of the policy was set after statistical studies were done by nationally recognized institutions such as the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA).

The research analyzed the characteristics of different age groups and reached the conclusion that the most vulnerable youth group, which had little focus in public policies, was from 18 to 24 years old.

The program's design notes that in 2003 there was a total of 23.4 million<sup>2</sup> young people between the ages of 18 and 24 among whom 753.4 thousand (5%) were illiterate; 5.4 million (3.5%) did not finish primary education; nearly 547 thousand (3.5%) young people had at least one year of higher education, and only 7.9 million (34%) went to school. (BRAZIL, 2005)

Income was also considered a sign of social exclusion of young people. Census data (IBGE) from 2000 revealed that 68.7% of young people in the age group studied lived in households with per capita income below one minimum wage, and among these 12.2% were from households with per capita income of up to  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the minimum wage. The income range above the minimum wage family represented 41.3% of the population.

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<sup>2</sup> National Research Data by Household Samples – PNAD, 2003. The 23.4 million young people between ages 18 and 24 correspond to 13.4% of the population of Brazil.

Another issue considered for delineating the target audience and the conditions for enrolling in the program was the situation in the job market. In the age group studied, 60% of young people had developed some type of occupation, while 13% declared themselves as unemployed. The highest unemployment rates were in metropolitan areas with 24.6%, while the urban areas reached 17.6%.

Other points were considered in the profile analysis, such as social inequality indicators, which highlighted the main problems faced by young Brazilians; restricted access to quality education and fragile conditions for staying in the school system; inadequate qualification for the working world; involvement with drugs; teen pregnancy; deaths from external causes (homicide, traffic accidents and suicide); little access to sports, leisure and culture. (BRAZIL, 2005: 9-10)

To complete the profile analysis, the 2000 Census revealed that 84% of young people from the age group studied were living in urban areas, and 31% of households were in metropolitan areas with little or no urban infrastructure, public facilities or public safety. Because this urban concentration and the rural population have very little in common, ProJovem has focused on the urban environment.

Juvenile vulnerability is strongly related to growth without the social and environmental sustainability of large cities. The study done to create ProJovem revealed that in cities that receive a higher flow of migration such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte and Brasilia, the situation is more serious. Young people are exposed to violence and social exclusion in broader dimensions than those of municipalities outside the metropolitan areas.

The ProJovem target audience was defined as youths from age 18 to 24, living in the capitals and metropolitan areas, who had reached the fourth grade of primary education, but had not completed primary education and did not at the time of enrollment have a formal work connection. The number of young people with this profile was 1.06 million. The goal of the program in 27 states was to serve 400,000 young people (40% of the young people with the ProJovem profile) during the period from 2005 to 2007.

Results of the evaluation done by the MES showed that 51.6% of enrolled youth continued all the way through with ProJovem, completed the course and received the primary education certification. The causes of dropouts and truancy in the program were attributed to the student's personal demands, because issues related to the management and design of the program had been quickly resolved. The evaluation did not include an analysis of program costs. (BRAZIL, 2010)

The challenge faced by ProJovem was to create mechanisms to interest young people and keep them in the course. Although ProJovem was not officially considered to be an income transfer policy, the program provided a subsidy to enrolled youth in the amount of 100 reais a month during its 12 months of duration. This incentive was needed, but did not guarantee that the youths would remain in the program.

The proposal to complete the primary education in 12 months would offer young people the opportunity to accelerate their education, to return to school and also the possibility to confront directly their precarious social conditions, such as underemployment.

By raising the level of education and providing professional training, the program stimulates this age group to break the cycle of poverty, which contributes directly to the demographic dividend. A young population with better educational conditions and better professional qualification increases the chances of the labor force forming a basis of accumulation of capital, which would balance or decrease the effects of the aging population.

The aging of the worldwide population is a reality and public policies should monitor this process in order to ensure that economic and social development is ongoing, based on principles that allow for a minimum economic threshold for maintaining human dignity.

Completion of primary education, the main goal of the program, was not enough to ensure adherence of the target audience. On the other hand, professional qualification was an important element to interest youth in the program. The third constituent element of ProJovem training was Community Action, which foresaw socially relevant actions involving the youth in their community. The idea of a universal training program for youth differentiated the program from other programs offered to this segment of the population, but did not guarantee that the students would remain in it.

Because of this, it is crucial to consider the question of the adherence of young people to public policies geared to this segment. This demand can be addressed through research that focuses on specific issues about values, community participation, political participation and trust in institutions, in order to identify the points that contribute to the growth of social capital.

The design of ProJovem in Brazil showed remarkable peculiarities. It was a program taken as a general policy, structured by many different dimensions, and also centralized under the command of the Presidency. Because of this, verticalization was sought, going beyond the techno-bureaucratic limits derived from eventual struggles and conflicts among different ministries that were already hosting programs that were tangential to the complex problem involving the economic, educational and social inclusion of the enormous population portion consisting of the defined target audience.

Because of this, another crucial point is the concern about community activities as being a really true test of a possible increase in social capital for each group; a way of assessing the program's ability to encourage and mobilize the public it serves to increase their social relations, quantitatively and qualitatively, with a view to possible integration into a society containing the "demographic dividend" – an exceptional historic opportunity – and to be increasingly modernized. Theoretically and

practically, the inclusion of people in a complex society such as the Brazil, which is emerging in its recent years of economic growth and political stability, demands of its inhabitants minimum levels of formal education, professional qualification and a capacity for social integration under the values of respect for differences (religious, political, ethnic and social). Hence the importance of analytical inferences about the concept of social capital as a not obviously explicit part of the program, but a constituent element of government action.

In the Brazilian case it is impossible to assess the impact of measures that would lead to increased social capital of the target audience. In the event of possible replication of the program, the formulation of specific research on this subject is suggested, so that potential impacts become the raw material for other important derivations to be evaluated and implemented by similar programs.

Finally, we must stress the importance of monitoring and evaluation in the process of implementing the policy, which determined changes in direction and also the new program design. With the unification of youth policies, ProJovem was renamed Urban ProJovem and its design has undergone restructuring and expanded its focus of action. The length of the course has changed from 12 to 18 months, the age group from 18 to 24 years to 18 to 29 years and coverage was extended to municipalities outside the metropolitan areas. Conditions of schooling (the young person must have completed at least the fourth grade of primary education) and lack of formal work connection have been abolished.

Brazil has focused on raising the levels of education for youth in its public policies. Countries such as Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have focused their policies on professional qualification of young people. Such differences are due to the social needs of each society. All local experiences, whether spontaneous or induced, should be considered in a correct process of replicability of policies. The next section of this study will focus on this topic.

Finally, it should be emphasized that after being created under the management of the National Youth Department, an agency linked to the Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic, the program will be absorbed by the Ministry of Education from the second half of 2011 with the aim of strengthening the educational

system and gaining scale. It is implied that the link to the Presidency in the first place was what allowed the maturation of the program and its coordination with various ministries.

## **5. ProJovem – Principal lessons learned**

The ProJovem program was designed as a macro policy to intervene in a focused reality, which was the vulnerability of the population between ages 18 and 24, old enough for active work, but with low education and little or no professional training,. Considering 2005 as its year of implementation, on the eve of the current "demographic dividend" it could be said that the program was an initiative that was proposed, in a short period of time, to realize in full the various demands that jointly involved the target audience.

Before discussing the training given in the process of implementing ProJovem, it is worth noting that the initiative to implement a comprehensive policy, but with a targeted public and margin of action, is something from which training can be extracted as an action strategy. This is because a policy built based on an assessment that guides the construction of its design and margin of action is potentially more likely to achieve positive results.

In the Brazilian case, the diagnosis made pointed to young people between 18 and 24 years old as the juvenile population in the most vulnerable situation, with low education, little or no professional training, no formal work connections, etc. This is why the demand for primary education and professional training were seen in the case of Brazil as a first step in breaking the cycle of exclusion that the young people served by ProJovem found themselves in. In other countries the diagnosis may indicate a different context needing intervention, and so it is essential to adapt the proposed programs to the reality and the demands of the public defined as a priority, for whom the programs must be tailored.

Despite the difficulty in management and ProJovem National Coordination having to assert its authority to deal with the divergences among the different systems that made up the original ProJovem, the government's option to implement a program with direct coordination of the Presidency, adding the other requests with it, has

characterized the National Youth Policy in Brazil as government policy, since the action was ultimately an action of the Presidency. Thus, one can deduce that the path taken by ProJovem as a government policy might be a recommended way to address structural problems.

Even having been discussed with several players, the ProJovem proposal initially arrived in municipalities without having yet defined the key issues, which could be defined better by vertical guidance from the National Coordination. This was the case, for example, of standardization of the minimum infrastructure for installing the Nuclei, which led to the operation of teaching units in highly precarious situations, using spaces such as church halls and neighborhood association headquarters, among others, thus subjecting students to the adversities of the "owners of the site." The definition of the locations of implementation under the responsibility of municipal coordinators could be considered a strategic mistake in the process of implementing the program, since a partnership with the public teaching units would have minimally solved the infrastructure problem.

The proposed vertical management format met with major challenges to be consolidated in the municipalities. Municipal coordinators and their teams had relatively short time periods in office, so that each professional who took the post had to learn over again what the program was and how it worked. This reveals that it is necessary to develop the most horizontal management process possible. If implementation is in the municipality, the municipal manager must participate and understand the demands of the program before committing to implementing it, thus minimizing factors such as high staff turnover of the management team.

The offer of a benefit in the amount of 100 reais to students with a minimum attendance of at least 75% and regular completion of activities requested by the teachers, coupled with professional training at the basic level and the integrated curriculum, based on training units aimed at young people's daily lives, with basic computer training, are elements that when articulated formed the strategy for adhesion and retention of youth in the program. In practice, this strategy was weakened by lack of standardization of activities at the local level. In implementing the program, registration forms and matriculation of the young people did not contain the necessary information to register them in the ProJovem system. Because of this many young people went

through the course without proper registration and therefore were barred from participating in external examinations. There were extreme cases of students who attended classes for a year but received no certification because of the mistakes in entering their information.

The fact that a Nucleus be located preferably in the area where the young person resides and be a specific part of community organization, proposes to young people the debate on how to intervene in their social space. This would enable intervention in activities about the social reality, with the support of educators and social workers from their respective units. Successful actions of this part of the program were presented at *I Mostra, Jovem! (1<sup>st</sup> Youth Exhibiton!)* held in 2010. However, it should be noted that there is a potential to be explored, therefore, with regard to the role of social workers, in developing the potential of community organization with young people in their place of residence, since there is a high truancy rate among the young people which must be confronted.

Professional training integrated into the school curriculum was an ambitious proposal. With it, two major problems were addressed (professional qualification integrated into the completion of primary education) in that the implementation of the qualification process proved to be complex due to lack of a logistic structure for its implementation in the teaching unit, as was expected.

ProJovem was one of the first policies that had a monitoring and evaluation system from its inception. Systems like this help to manage the program and make it possible to correct problems observed during the implementation of the policy. Therefore it could be said that the development of the program, coupled with the development of MES, caused the activities to be rescheduled and the issues needing evaluation were observed throughout the process. Thus, the experience of ProJovem revealed that the union of educational institutions can contribute significantly to the development of public policies and raise discussion about the methodologies and tools to be used.

Taking the Brazilian ProJovem as a base, a possible breakthrough in implementation would be the linking of the training offered in the Ministry of Labor and Employment program to the labor intervention policy, also developed in this

agency. This is because, if the training offered, even at a basic level, would make a difference in keeping young people in the course, the possibility of being placed in the job market through it could provide a quantum leap in the expectations of the target population in relation to their future possibilities.

Another element to be added is the character assumed by the scholarship as being an actual income transfer, although under the program is not considered as such. Thus, the opportunity to assess the impact of this actual income transfer was underestimated. It would be advisable in the case of replicating the program in other countries to develop methodological strategies for assessing the impact of this action.

## **6. ProJovem – For an international replicability**

Given the considerations, it is understood that the following points would be advisable:

- It is fundamental to use robust socio-demographic data to delineate policy priorities for youth, especially taking into account the broader picture of the demographic transition experienced by many middle-income countries.
- In the implementation phase, establishing direct coordination of the Presidency in youth policies helps characterize this type of action as a government policy and ensures the commitment of several areas of government and the intersectoral nature of the themes.
- Design of an indicator monitoring model starting from the conception of the youth-focused public policy is the key to sustaining policies and proper monitoring of the various stages of the program.
- An emphasis on the role of youth as agents of change in the community should be linked to income generation and this segment's own professional qualification.
- The link between formal education, training and community participation to generate income, which allows the challenge of social inclusion to be confronted in an intersectoral and sustainable way.
- The union of educational institutions, not only in monitoring but also in the formulation of youth policies, contributes significantly to improving the

management, development of methodologies and tools to be used for evaluation and planning of activities for this segment.

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